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Resumen 
El presente artículo examina el efecto de las tasas marginales del impuesto sobre la 
renta en el mercado laboral en México, utilizando una versión modificada del modelo de 
tributación sobre la renta personal de Rosen (1976). El estudio analiza las reaccciones 
de los trabajadores asalariados del sector formal ante los cambios en la tasa marginal 
del impuesto sobre la renta. Prestamos especial antención a la muestra, con el fin de 
controlar en nuestros cálculos el problema del alto índice de evasión fiscal en México. 
Comprobamos como las horas de trabajo disminuyen cuando las tasas marginales del 
impuesto sobre la renta aumentan.  
Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of marginal income tax rates on labor supply in Mexico 
using a modified version of Rosen´s (1976) personal income taxation model. The study 
analyzes how salaried workers of the formal sector react to changes in the marginal 
income tax rate. Special attention is given to the sample, in order to control the problem 
of the high level of tax evasion in Mexico in our estimation. We find evidence that hours 
of work diminish when marginal income tax rates increase. 
  
1. Introduction  
            The analysis of the behavioral response to taxation is a subject of great importance for 
policy makers. Taxation may affect the choice between work and leisure, occupation, savings, 
among others. These decisions affect revenue collection and social welfare evaluation (Triest, 
1998). 
   Reliable estimates of how taxes affect behavior are useful for undertaking tax policy 
and social welfare estimation. Most theoretical models, however, are silent about how 
taxation affects the desired hours of work since hours worked depend on the magnitude 
of the substitution and income effects (Slemrod, 1998).1 
   Estimates of the elasticity of labor supply to income tax rate changes show that its 
magnitude is small, with a consensus elasticity of about -0.1 for males [see Hausman 
(1985), MaCurdy, et. al. (1990), and Triest (1998)]. This elasticity implies that a 10 
percent increase in net wage, leads, on average, to a one percent decline in hours 
worked. On the other hand, for aggregate data, Mendoza, et al. (1993) have found a 
significant effect of income taxes on hours worked for United States, United Kingdom 
and Japan. 
   For developing countries, as far as we know, most estimates have been performed 
using aggregate data. The estimations show that hours of work are not sensitive to tax 
rate changes (Gandhi, 1987). Using data at the firm level Gruber (1997) finds little effect 
of payroll taxation on employment in Chile. 
   In Mexico, the only attempt to measure this sort of distortion, to our knowledge, has 
been done by Meléndez (1996). The study estimated elasticities for the Metropolitan 
Area of Monterrey, the second largest city in Mexico. His results show that income tax 
rates do not have any significant effect on hours of work for married men, women or 
housewives. 
   This finding is interesting in light of recent changes in the income tax code of Mexico. 
During the last decade, personal income tax policy was aimed at reducing the top 
marginal tax rate on income, reducing the number of tax brackets, and broadening the 
income tax base. The marginal tax rate went from 55 percent in 1980 to 35 percent in 
1990, remaining at this level until 1998. The number of income brackets was reduced 
from 26 to 8 and, at the same time, some personal income tax deductions were 
eliminated (Aspe, 1993; Tijerina and Medellín, 1999). 
   However, in January 1999, the Mexican income tax code moved in the opposite 
direction. Personal income was subjected to two more income tax brackets for those 
with high incomes (i.e., 37.5 and 40 percent marginal tax rates). The rationale behind 
this increase was the need to increase tax revenues, in addition to the implicit 
assumption that welfare loss was minimal (Secretaría de Gobierno, 1998). Nonetheless, 
as argued above, the magnitude of the welfare loss derived from higher marginal tax 
rates on income depends critically on the estimation of the effect of income taxation on 
labor supply.2 
   The objective of this paper is to estimate the effect of marginal tax rates on personal 
income on labor supply by "formal" salaried workers in Mexico during the third quarter 
of 1997, using the National Urban Employment Survey conducted by INEGI and 
Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (INEGI and STPS, 1998). Given the high level 
of estimated tax evasion in Mexico, we only included formal salaried workers. Firms 
hiring these workers must withhold their taxes, and act as a third party collecting 
revenue on behalf of the federal government. In this sense, formal workers are less 
prone to tax evasion. We have excluded workers in the informal sector because by 
definition they do not pay income taxes. In other words, we are working with a sample 
of individuals whose labor supply is suspected to be highly inelastic, since their options 
may be limited to work in the informal sector or being unemployed under a system 
where social security for the unemployed is not available. 
   The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents the theoretical model applied in 
our estimation, which rest on a variation of Rosen (1976). Section 3 estimates the 
model and presents the results. We find that marginal tax rates on personal income 
have a small but adverse effect on labor supply for salaried workers in the formal sector 
of the economy. The estimated elasticity of hours of work with respect to the marginal 
tax rate ranges from -0.025 to -0.021. Also, a model that attempts to capture the effect 
of progresivity of the income tax rates on hours fo work is estimated. The results 
confirm that higher marginal income tax rates are associated with larger distortions in 
the time allocated to work. The elasticity varies from -0.10 for a tax rate of 0.17, to -
0.283 for the top marginal tax rate of 0.35. Section 4 concludes with some comments 
and suggestions for further research in this area for Mexico. 
 
 
2. Theoretical model 
 
   Progressive income tax rates are common in most countries (see some evidence in 
Shome, 1995). Although there are different forms of measuring progressivity, the 
practice usually defines it as increasing marginal tax rates as taxable income rises 
(Musgrave and Musgrave, 1992). The progressive structure of most personal income 
tax schemes might impose important distortions on labor supply depending on the 
magnitude of the substitution and income effects. A particular case is the effect of 
marginal income tax rates on desired hours of work and leisure. That is, eventhough a 
change in marginal income tax rates does not lead to a change in the labor status of the 
worker (i.e. empolyed vs. unemployed), it may significantly change the hours devoted to 
work vis-a-vis leisure time. 
   For that purpose, we follow Rosen´s model (1976). Formally, the model states that the 
problem of a typical consumer is: 
 
where U is ordinal utility; C is consumption; H is hours of work; and Z is a vector of 
parameters that affect the tradeoff between income and non-market activity. w is the 
wage rate per hour that depends on H and X, where X is a vector of characteristics that 
determines the value of the wage per hour at any number of hours; (H,X) is the average 
tax rate as a function of H and X; and Y is net of taxes non-labor income. 
   Several important facts derive from this model as discussed by Rosen (1976). First, 
the slope of the budget line is not w, but w(H)+H*w´(H). 3Second, an interior solution 
requires not only that the utility function be convex, but that its curvature be "sharper" 
than that of the budget line. Third, it is possible that the decision about the number of 
hours of two individuals be the same, but their non-labor income differ among them; that 
is, they have the same slope, but different intercept. This feature leads to a correction in 
the budget line in the empirical implementation of the model as explained by Rosen 
(1976). 
   The equations to estimate for wages (w) and hours of work (H) proposed by Rosen 
(1976) are: 
 
 
.  
   MEj is marginal earnings , and can be interpreted as the 
wage rate per hour, adjusted by the number of hours of work. tj is the effective tax rate 
and uj and are random errors. Xij is a (N x K) matrix of explanatory variables 
including a constant, and Zij is a (N x M) matrix of explanatory variables for hours of 
work, both including a constant.  are parameters to estimate, where
 are 1 x K and 1 x M row vectors. Equation (2) is an ordinary earnings 
function plus a variable for hours of work, and equation (3) shows the dependence of 
hours of work on marginal earnings and other characteristics associated with the 
individual. Since the effective tax rate tj is unobservable to us, we use instead the 
marginal tax rate ( j) administered by the government.4 Thus, we can rewrite equation 
(3) as: 
 
   Note that this formulation explicitly assumes that the marginal tax rate affects hours of 
work and gives us a meaningful way to test whether the marginal rate has any 
distortionary effect in the allocation of hours of work. 
   We also estimated a variation of Rosen´s model that assumes that wage per hour is 
independent of hours of work. As can be easily shown, equation (4) reduces to the 
estimated w. In order to capture if there is an increasing distortion in labor allocation as 
the marginal tax rate on personal income rises, we estimate equation (5) including the 
square of the marginal tax rate. This formulation resembles closely the derivation of the 
deadweight loss estimation of taxes in most public finance textbooks (Atkinson and 
Stiglitz, 1980). 
 
 
3. Empirical implementation 
 
   This section estimates equations (2) and (5). Available surveys in Mexico that analyze 
the labor market do not deal directly with tax questions; thus, we had to generate some 
of the variables for our analysis. 
   Data and estimation of the variables 
   We use data for the third quarter of 1997 from the National Urban Employment 
Survey, conducted by INEGI and Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social (INEGI and 
STPS, 1998). 
   We focus on salaried workers which are subject to increasing tax rates on personal 
income, and whose income tax is withheld by their employers. We also limit the sample 
to those who work in the formal sector. In our case, a worker is employed in the formal 
sector if he/she works in a business that is registered at the tax authority and/or has a 
name.5 Workers in the informal sector are excluded because -by definition- they do not 
pay personal income taxes (Mourmouras and Tijerina, 1999; and Pagán and Tijerina, 
2000)6. Finally, we restricted the sample to those workers who worked less than 90 
hours per week because this variable is top-coded and there were only a few cases of 
individuals registered at that limit. In addition, the Mexican Labor code establishes a 
work shift of 48 hours per week (Secretaría del Trabajo y Prevision Social, 1998).7 
   Since the survey reflects the earnings of workers net of taxes, we have to estimate 
gross earnings. Appendix 1 shows the procedure employed to estimate gross earnings. 
   Information about net non-labor income is not available in the survey. Therefore, we 
proxy this variable with total net income of the spouse and direct descendents (sons 
and daughters).8 
   The rest of the variables used like age, years of education, gender, marital status, 
size of the firm, and so on, are readily available from the survey. In total, we have 
71,756 observations. 
 
   Estimation procedure 
   As argued by Rosen (1976), in order to estimate equations (2), (4) and (5) we need to 
evaluate the functions at some "standard number of hours". We have chosen 46 hours 
because this cutoff corresponds to the average number of work hours of the sample. 
Evaluating at this number of hours of work, this procedure attempts to control for the 
endogeneity of the marginal tax rate and income. Since Xij is exogenous, and MEj 
and  are evaluated at the "standard" number of hours, there is not correlation 
between these variables and the error term  and equation (5) can be estimated by 
ordinary least squares.9 
   Upon estimation of equation (2) by the instrumental variables method, we found that 
the estimated was sensible not only to the choice of vector X but also to the 
instruments used. 
   Given these results, we experimented with a different version of Rosen´s (1976) 
model, and estimated equation (2) as a simple earnings function, that as explained 
above, implies that the ME function reduces to the estimated wage rate. We retained 
his specification about the evaluation of ME at a standard number of hours of work ir 
order to control for the endogeneity problem. Thus, we estimate the log of the wage per 
hour as a function of education, experience and experience squared. A "border" dummy 
variable was also included to account for location within the U.S.-Mexico border given 
that hourly wages tend to be higher in this area. In order to improve the estimation 
results we added the following variables: education squared, experience cubic, male, 
married and employed in a large firm.10 The procedure involves estimating equation 
(2)´ and (5) by ordinary least squares (OLS): 
 
 
   Results 
   The estimation of equations (2) and (2)´ are shown in Table 1. Notice that the 
coefficients have the expected sign. From these parameters, we estimated MEj 
following equations (4) and (4)´. Once we had (2), (2)´, (4) and (4)´, we proceeded to 
estimate equation (5) for each case. 
 
 
   The variables included in the regression for hours of work were MEj,  border, 
gender, marital status, size of the firm, non-labor income (NLI) and non-labor income of 
married men (NLIMM). This last variable is included to avoid a bias in the estimated 
parameters because most of the married men are almost always in the labor force and 
we expect lower income elasticities for them than for married women or for single men.. 
   We now turn our attention to estimating equation (5). The regression results are 
shown in column (1) of Table 2 for Rosen´s model. The coefficients for marginal 
earnings (ME) and marginal taxes  have the expected sign and are statistically 
significant. The observed elasticities of hours of work with respect to the marginal 
income tax rate (evaluated at 0.10, the median value of the sample) is very small, -
0.042. If we do not include the variable NLIMM the elasticity obtained is about the 
same, implying that there is not a significant difference between married and single 
workers. The elasticities of hours of work with respect to marginal wage are around 
0.002 and 0.008, and the compensated elasticities are around 0.057 (columm 2 in table 
2) and 0.066 (columm 1). 
     These elasticities are much more smaller than the elasticity found in the U.S. 
(Hausman, 1985; MaCurdy, et. al., 1990; and Triest, 1998). However, it is worth noticing 
that it is significant in a sample of individuals whose labor supply was suspected to be 
more inelastic. 
   We also estimated a model that attempts to capture the greater distortions on labor 
allocation atributed to higher marginal income tax rates (see Musgrave and Musgrave, 
1992; Atkinson and Siglitz, 1980). The model includes the variable  to reflect 
the formulation of the deadweight loss estimation of taxes. The results are shown in 
column (5) of table 2, and all variables have the expected signs. The elasticity of hours 
of work with respect to the mean income tax rate changes to -0.125 showing the 
importance of the tax sctructure. 
 
 
 
   The estimated elasticities of hours of work with respect to marginal income tax rates 
at their different levels are presented in Table 2. The results reflect the quadratic nature 
of the estimated equation. The elasticity grows with the marginal tax rate level. Notice 
that the elasticity at the top marginal income tax rate is -1.858, indicating that high 
income earners are more sensitive to marginal income tax rate changes than workers 
subject to lower marginal income tax rates. Those workers are going to spend more 
hours on other activities such as leisure. 
 
 
 
   Thus, although politically it seems acceptable that higher marginal tax rates on top 
income earners is the solution to increase government revenue, our results show that 
this type of policy leads to a large distortion -reduction- in the desired hours of work of 
high income earners in Mexico. What this finding points out, is that if the objective is to 
increase government revenues in Mexico, there may be more efficient ways of doing so, 
such as broadening tax bases, specially on consumption, where it has been 
documented that there exist large exemptions and preferential treatments (OECD, 
1999). 
 
 
 
4. Final comments 
 
   This paper attempts to estimate the sensitivity of hours of work to changes in personal 
income tax rates for Mexico. The sample consists of salaried workers in the formal 
sector of the economy. The data set used comes from the National Urban Employment 
Survey for the third quarter of 1997. Using a modified version of the model by Rosen 
(1976), we find that marginal income tax rates have an important but small adverse 
effect on the hours of work supplied by individuals. The elasticity of hours of work with 
respect to the marginal tax rate is in the order of -0.042 for the average individual. This 
value is below the range obtained in different studies for developed countries. 
   However, when we take into account the progressivity of the marginal tax rate 
imbedded in the personal income tax code, we estimate an average tax elasticity of -
0.125. When we estimate the elasticities by tax brackets we find that this elasticity 
increases up to -1.858 for the top marginal rate of 35 percent. 
   This is an important finding for the design of tax policy making, and specially when 
one considers that our estimation includes only a group of workers whose response to 
tax changes is expected to be low. In this sense, it is possible to argue that increasing 
marginal income tax rates might have significant distortionary effects on the allocation 
of labor in Mexico, specially on top income earners. 
   In this sense, if the objective is to increase government revenues in Mexico, there 
appear to be better alternatives ways of doing so. In particular, resorting to a 
broadening of the tax base on consumption could be a more efficient tax policy, amid 
the political effect of such a policy. 
  The estimation is an initial step towards a more complete study of the effect of taxes 
on labor supply in Mexico. Future research must consider estimating not only the effect 
of taxes on desired hours of work of salaried workers, but labor participation in different 
sectors such as the informal sector or self-employment.  
 
   Appendix 1. Estimation of gross earnings 
 
   This appendix estimates gross earnings for the individuals of our sample. Since net 
earnings are recorded in the survey, the procedure involves going from net earnings 
backwards to estimates gross earnings. This is done using the tariff, subsidy, and credit 
tables for 1997 (articles 80, 80-A and 80-B of the income tax code; see Themis, 1997).  
   The income tax code contains eight income brackets, with marginal tax rates 
increasing with taxable income.11 Marginal tax rates ranged from 3 percent to 35 
percent. This is the first component of the calculation for the tax due. The second 
component is the estimation of the subsidy, which is more complex.12 First, the 
proportion of the monetary benefit to total earnings (including monetary and non-
monetary such as meals and transportation offered by the firm to its employees,) is 
estimated for each employee. Then, the mean value of this proportion, called "p", is 
calculated for all workers within a firm. Since the survey does not contain this sort of 
information, we assumed that the proportion equals 75 percent. Thus, the allowance 
amounts to about half of the subsidy that would be transferred if there were no non-
monetary benefits. The third component is the credit. As legislation establishes, the 
amount of the credit decreases as taxable income increases.  
   More formally, monthly net earnings are:  
 
(A1) Wn = Wb - T1 + T2 + T3,  
 
where Wn is monthly earnings net of taxes, Wb is monthly gross taxable earnings, and 
T1, T2 and T3 are as explained below.  
   T1 refers to the application of the marginal tax rate depending upon the income tax 
bracket of the taxpayer, and a fixed quota:  
 
(A2) T1 = (Wb - Wbmin) * mgtax + FQ1  
 
where Wbmin is the monthly gross minimum taxable earnings at the corresponding 
income tax bracket; mgtax is the marginal tax rate applicable to all income in excess of 
the minimum taxable income for each bracket, and FQ1 is a fix quota that decreases as 
taxable income rises as established in the income tax code. In 1997 there were 8 
income brackets.  
   T2 refers to the subsidy, which as explained, depends on the ratio of non-monetary 
benefits provided by the firm to its employees to total earnings. The higher this benefit, 
the lower the subsidy:  
 
(A3) T2 = S - 2*S*(1-p) = S*[2*p - 1]  
 
where S stands for the amount of the subsidy. The subsidy is adjusted by "p" (called 
also de the "employer p"). p is defined as the ratio of monetary earnings to total 
earnings. In our estimation, as we mentioned, we set p=3/4, that is, 25 percent of total 
earnings is obtained in terms of fringe benefits. Further, the subsidy is defined as:  
 
(A4) S = (Wbs - Wbsmin) * mgtaxs * mgtax + FQs  
 
where Wbs is monthly gross earnings used to calculate the subsidy and Wbsmin is the 
minimum monthly gross earnings needed to qualify for a subsidy. mgtaxs is the 
marginal tax rate applicable to monthly gross earnings above Wbsmin, and FQs is a 
fixed quota as described in the income tax code. In 1997, there were 10 brackets.  
   The credit is also a fixed amount. In 1997 there were three income brackets for the 
application of this credit. In our notation, this would be:  
 
(A5) T3 = Cr  
   Column 11 in Table A1 presents the personal tax income due in 1997 according to the 
income tax code, while column 12 gives us net earnings. Gross earnings are then 
obtained by solving Wb from equation (A1).  
 
 
 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
1 Few authors have attempted to sign the total tax effect using the level of government 
services provided; see Conway (1997). 
 2 We should point that this policy also affects capital income, since both taxes are fully 
intergrated. For a review of different income tax systems see Shome (1995). 
 3 See Rosen (1976) for the motivation as to why hours of work and wage per hour may 
not be independent.  
 4 We should note that we are not trying to test whether individuals look at the marginal 
income tax rate or the effective tax rate in making their decisions about labor supply. 
Rather, we are interested in estimating whether or not the marginal tax rate on income 
has any effect on hours of work supplied. 
 5 This definition is due to Roubaud (1995). 
 6 We also believe the informal sector merits itself a separate analysis, since its size 
amounts up to 20 percent of the labor force employed, plus the fact that existent 
empirical work does not conclude if the informal sector is a safety net against 
unmeployment. See for instance, Guergil (1988) and Jusidman (1993). 
 7 Refer to articles 61 and 69 of the Federal Labor Law in Mexico. 
 8 We also used total net income of the persons living in the same house. The 
estimation results did not change significatively, and are available upon request to the 
authors. 
 9 Estimating MEj at 46 hours per week, implied reestimating the marginal tax rate 
aplicable to monthly earnings at H=46. 
 10 The definition of firm´s size is as follows. Large: more than 250 workers; medium: 
101 - 250 workers; small: 16 -100 workers; micro: 1 - 15 workers. 
11 Taxable income is similar to all income from work since there are very few 
deductions allowed, like medical and funeral expenses. Other income, such as interest 
earnings, are taxed at the source. 
 12 The idea of the subsidy is to compensate to those individuals that did not receive 
non monetary benefits from their employer.. 
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